The Middle East War Enters a New Phase by Richard Haass

Richard Haass thinks the US attacks on three nuclear sites raise more questions than have been answered so far.

It takes only one side to start a war, but it takes all parties involved to end one. In this latest crisis in the Middle East, initiative has passed from Israel to the US and now to Iran, which now must decide if the US attack is the beginning of the end or the end of the beginning.

NEW YORK – We are now in the third phase of the current crisis in the Middle East. In the previous two phases, the initiative was with Israel and then the United States. Now it has passed to Iran.

To recap: In the first phase, Israel, concerned that Iran had moved much closer to developing nuclear weapons, attacked Iranian military sites, nuclear installations, and leadership figures. Israel’s government, more risk-averse in the wake of the Hamas attack of October 7, was no longer constrained by fear of retaliation from Iranian proxies it had degraded or by Iran’s ability to defend itself, which Israel had also weakened.

The war’s second phase was initiated by the US, which targeted three installations central to Iran’s nuclear program. B-2 stealth bombers dropped a number of large “bunker buster” bombs over the uranium enrichment complexes at Fordow and Natanz while US submarines launched Tomahawk cruise missiles at the nuclear facility in Isfahan.

For both Israel and the US, this was a war of choice: other options were available. Moreover, the attacks were preventive, rather than preemptive, in the sense that an Iranian nuclear breakout was a gathering threat, not an imminent one. It is less clear why the US acted when it did, other than that diplomacy looked unpromising and there was an opportunity to undertake the mission with minimum risk to US forces. That said, both Israel and the US had run out of patience with Iran, which was enriching uranium to levels that made sense only if its goal was to develop nuclear weapons rather than generate electricity.

US President Donald Trump claimed that the attacks he ordered were a spectacular military success and that the three Iranian facilities were completely “obliterated.” This has yet to be shown. Normally, assessing bomb damage in such circumstances takes some time, and is as much an art as a science.

More important, the attack could have succeeded in destroying the three selected facilities but failed in the larger sense of eliminating Iran’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons. In fact, this is almost certain to be the case, as Iran had ample opportunity to relocate enriched uranium, advanced centrifuges, and other bomb-related technology to multiple locations that for now are unknown.

What, then, should we expect from Iran? Much is being written about Iran’s retaliatory options. Iran could wage cyber warfare against targets in the US or around the world. It could mount assorted terrorist actions against American civilians, businesses, and embassies. It could attack the estimated 40,000 US troops in the Middle East, as well as the energy infrastructure of its Arab neighbors. It could further interfere with shipping in local waterways, either directly or through a proxy such as Yemen’s Houthis.

But it is not obvious that Iran would do any of this now. The performative “attack” on the US base in Qatar signaled that Iran wants to avoid further escalation and exposing itself to more attacks targeting its economy and its military and political leaders. As a result, Iran is likely to focus on shoring up the regime domestically, to ensure its survival.

Over time, Iran can also be expected to try to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program, as many there will judge the Israeli and American attacks never would have happened had Iran possessed a nuclear deterrent. Diplomacy is unlikely to prevent Iran from succeeding, which means that, with or without a ceasefire, Israel or US attacks could well be required whenever and wherever it is discovered that Iran is carrying out nuclear weapons-related work.

This reality will lead many to argue that nothing short of regime change will prevent the eventual emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran, a development that would pose an existential threat to Israel and lead more countries in the region to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. Not surprisingly, we are already hearing calls for regime change from some in Israel and in the US.

But regime change is easier said than done. It tends to happen when there is a strong, organized internal opposition, a crumbling regime, or an outside power willing and able to oust the leadership, occupy the country, and insert a successor. None of these conditions exists in Iran. All of which is to say outsiders would be wise to base policy toward Iran on the assumption that the current government or something much like it will be in charge for the foreseeable future.

It is a truism that it takes only one side to start a war, but that ending one requires all parties involved. In this Middle East crisis, the initiative is now with Iran. Only its rulers can decide if the US attack is the beginning of the end or the end of the beginning. It is difficult to overstate how much depends on their answer.